The Trump Administration’s Missed Opportunities
The Trump Administration's "America First" strategy is unnecessarily alienating Europe and missing key opportunities, thereby relinquishing global leadership and influence to rivals like China. With tensions rising, can the U.S. reclaim leadership, or is the West's power slipping away? Christine Arakelian dives into what’s at stake.
Christine Arakelian
Feb 25, 2025 - 7:43 PM

Throwing Down the Gauntlet: A New Sheriff is in Town
The Trump Administration’s negotiations with Russia in Saudi Arabia were a watershed moment in European politics. Talks encompassed potential terms to end the Ukrainian war, a future summit between Trump and Putin and U.S.-Russia economic cooperation. Notably absent were Ukraine nor any European government.
While Trump officials may have softened earlier remarks about excluding Ukraine and Europe from negotiations, they’ve remained firm on key positions. Defense Secretary Hegseth unapologetically stated that it’s unrealistic for Ukraine to regain pre-2014 borders or secure NATO membership in a negotiated settlement - positions unchanged despite fierce criticism from global foreign policy elites.
From a European viewpoint, Vice President Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference only added fuel to the fire. Vance harshly criticized European democracies for retreating from core Western values, such as religious freedom and free speech, and supporting mass migration. European centrists were left reeling, while the European right was cheering. Trump’s domestic base was clearly thrilled by the European comeuppance, but the question remains on whether this was a real or Pyrrhic win.
Hell Hath No Fury Like a Woman Scorned
In response to the perceived snub from the Americans, French President Macron convened an emergency summit in Paris with key European leaders to discuss European security and the situation in Ukraine. Attendees included Germany, the U.K., Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark. Dutch Prime Minister Schoof wryly pointed out that the key to gaining a seat at the table is understanding Europe’s collective contribution—though the specifics of a unified European approach remain uncertain.
Europe, it seems, is more united by a shared desire to avoid being relegated to the “kiddie table” by the U.S. than by a clear vision of what it wants. So successful was the first summit that Macron organized a second one, this time extending invitations to Canada and a range of other European nations that had been absent from the initial gathering.
The U.S. Must Lead from the Center of Europe – Not its Peripheries
At this moment, European support for a peace settlement with Russia and its reintegration into European structures is mostly limited to the so-called “bad boys” of Europe - countries like Hungary and Slovakia. The challenge is that the United States cannot effectively lead Europe from the periphery. U.S. leadership in Europe must emanate from the center, and there is no European center that excludes France and Germany.
There are conservatives who argue that the center of gravity in Europe will shift decisively to the East such that France and Germany should no longer be dominant considerations for the United States. Regretfully their wishful thinking fails to address an analysis of what Germany will do when it is excluded and alienated from key economic and decision making structures on the European continent. WWI and WWII should dispel any notion that peace and security on the European continent can exclude Germany altogether.
The Trump Administration is Unifying Europeans Against the United States
Macron just met with President Trump at the White House, but with a bit more foresight, the United States would have had the upper hand. Macron has spent more time speaking with Putin than virtually any other European leader. At the onset of the war and shortly thereafter, Macon essentially argued that Russia’s diplomatic and economic isolation necessitated more – not less – dialogue to ensure that the conflict did not spin out of control.
Macron has ample domestic political reasons to reconsider his viewpoints on Russia and Ukraine – namely, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally’s party challenge to his incumbency from the right. Le Pen and her National Rally party have had considerable simpatico with Putin over many years and have been fierce critics of the war in Ukraine.
Instead, Macron is now enjoying his Charles de Gaulle moment. He arrived in D.C. with righteous indignation and a European continent largely united in opposition to the United States.
Former Chancellor Scholz from the SPD party had been embroiled in an acrimonious debate with Macron for months due to their conflicting views on the war in Ukraine. Scholz viewed Macron as a loose cannon for suggesting that Western troops should be deployed to Ukraine. Macron criticized Scholz for not sending Taurus missiles to Kyiv. The SPD party had long-standing ties with Russia that were cut off due to the war in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, Vice President Vance did not meet with former Chancellor Scholz at the Munich Security Conference, but did meet with AFD leader Alice Weidel. This was widely interpreted as election interference in Germany. There is currently no scenario in which AFD will be part of the governing coalition. The SPD, notwithstanding their historic loss, will likely remain in the new governing coalition.
Chancellor candidate Merz now has little political incentive to accommodate the new U.S. position on Russia. The AFD is the leading German political party in favor of rehabilitating Russia into a European framework and pulling the plug on the war in Ukraine – but Merz is committed to keeping the AFD out of power. His former CDU rival Angela Merkel has been roundly criticized for her Russian trade ties (including President Trump), and the SPD is a diminished coalition partner.
Hence, Merz wasted no time in asserting that the Trump Administration is indifferent to the fate of Europe. Notwithstanding a long history of being a trans-Atlanticist, he is now seeking a strong and unified Europe that can achieve “independence” from the United States.
Winning Means the Right Becomes the New Center
The Trump Administration needs to reconceptualize what “winning” means. One version of winning is rubbing people’s noses in it, spiking the football in the end zone and exclusively supporting European right-wing parties. While this approach might boost ratings for Fox News and provide talking points for conservative commentators, it risks overshadowing a more significant and enduring goal for both Trump and the United States: a lasting legacy.
Vice President Vance made his electoral preferences abundantly clear when he met with AFD leader Alice Weidel. But ultimately there is no long term gain for the United States. AFD will not be in power in the near term. Just like the United States cannot lead Europe from the periphery of Hungary and Slovakia, the United States also cannot lead from political parties that sit outside the mainstream political consensus. Mainstream political consensus must be determined by the people of Germany, not the United States.
Rather than pick and choose favorite political parties, the Trump Administration’s real goal should ultimately be to shift the European center to the right such that the right becomes the new center. Italian Prime Minister Meloni is a good example of this type of political evolution. Prior to her election, there were hysterics that she was a right-wing extremist. Now the news organization Politico has ordained Meloni the most powerful, influential politician in Europe and thinks nothing of it.
That’s the type of win that Trump needs in Europe – winning on the substance without people feeling the sting of it. With this type of strategy, whether the AFD wins an election in Germany is beside the point. It sets the stage for a long-term trans-Atlantic alliance based on shared values and interests.
The Europeans Have a Point: What Precisely is Russia Conceding?
Defense Secretary Hegseth is correct in stating that there’s no realistic scenario for Ukraine to regain its lost territory. However, if one takes a step back and looks at the European theater as a whole, new negotiation opportunities become obvious.
At a minimum, the Trump Administration should push for a Russian withdrawal from the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, using this as a trade-off for any concessions regarding Ukraine. Georgia has consistently advocated for the peaceful return of these regions, and Russia must be held accountable for its actions, paying more than mere lip service to the concept of territorial integrity. As part of this agreement, Georgia should offer the U.S. the development rights to the Anaklia Black Sea port in exchange for American support. The Biden Administration made a strategic error by allowing China to seize control of this vital port, and the Trump Administration should aim to reverse this mistake.
Furthermore, the U.S. and Armenia should jointly develop the Zangezur Corridor as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road initiative. This development should be included as part of a broader U.S.-Russia negotiated settlement on Ukraine. The discussions between the U.S. and Russia already encompass commercial interests and hence, there’s no reason to exclude this region when it is the key to unlocking U.S. and Western access to rare earth elements (REE) in Central Asia. Russia and the U.S. are strategically aligned on preventing China from controlling the Middle Corridor, key Black sea ports and Central Asian REE. These areas of overlapping interests should be jointly developed as a long-standing basis for peace on the European continent.
Political Instability in the West is China’s Biggest Asset
There has been much talk in the United States about the need to pivot to Asia and the necessity of the Europeans taking the lead on their own security. The U.S. won’t succeed in this endeavor if the U.S. is fundamentally at odds with key European powers. It will be viewed as a sign of internal division and weakness.
Political instability in the West is China’s biggest strategic asset. The internal divisions within the West effectively lower the bar for China, which doesn’t need the best proposal—just one that avoids long-term drama, vacillation and political whiplash.
The Trump Administration should prioritize recalibrating the center of gravity within the West to the right. This goal, more important than any deal on Ukraine or any favorite political party, would lay the groundwork for a new Pax Americana in the 21st century inclusive of Russia, with wide-spread peace and prosperity for the United States, Europe, Middle East and Asia.
As the Trump Administration seeks to redefine America’s role on the global stage, the question remains: Can the United States reassert itself as the undisputed leader of the West, or has its internal discord and fractured relationships with key European powers created an opening for rivals like China to take the reins?

Christine Arakelian
Fellow at the Armenian Society of Fellows | Regional Expert